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Realigning Federal Statutes: Contradictions
Between the Federal Arbitration Act
and the National Labor Relations Act
Denise Han1
Christopher Steele and Brendan Leveron were employees at a private
maintenance company named Pinnacle. Both Steele and Leveron
reported that Pinnacle allegedly forced them to work overtime without just compensation—an allegation that, if proven valid, would
violate the Fair Labor Standards Act and California state law. They
also claimed that Pinnacle was guilty of unfair business practices,
retaliation and whistleblowing violations, and a failure to account.
Soon after Steele and Leveron filed these allegations, they discovered that their predicament was not unique across the firm. In 2012,
they decided to represent their fellow employees in a class-action suit
which so that they could share the costs of hiring a lawyer, paying
court fees, and gathering evidence.2 As part of their hiring process,
though, Pinnacle had forced their employees to sign agreements to
binding individual arbitration. Because these contracts were already
in place by the time Steele and Leveron’s case reached the courts,
the court dismissed the case and compelled all Pinnacle employees
to settle their cases in arbitration. Without the opportunity to participate in a class-action suit, each employee would need to provide for
all costs associated with the lawsuit and surrender their fate to the
1
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decision of only one arbitrator or panel with no option of appeal. In
addition to this, they would forfeit their opportunity to represent and
assist hundreds of fellow employees who found themselves without
the means of pursuing litigation.
Similar situations are occurring across the nation as businesses
and large corporations increasingly utilize the Federal Arbitration
Act (the “FAA”)3 to prevent class action suits. Currently, the number of cases directly affected is in the tens of millions.4 The issue
centers on the legal system prioritizing the enforcement of questionable contract provisions over employees’ constitutional right to sue
within their financial ability. Most recently, the Supreme Court of the
United States overturned the Supreme Court of California’s decision
in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis and ruled that class action waivers
were enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act.5 Because this
ruling essentially allows employers to use the Federal Arbitration
Act as a loophole through which they may prevent their employees
from seeking redress, it reveals the more specific ethical and legal
underpinnings of this nation’s jurisprudence.
This article examines the recent decision made by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis regarding the unconscionability of class action waivers in employment law
under the FAA and the NLRA and explores the implications of public policy and business decisions. By weighing these contradictions
in the legal system, this article advances the claim that either the
judicial court system must overturn the recent decision, or the legislature ought to realign the goals of the Federal Arbitration Act with
those of the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”) and enact
an amendment to the FAA, expressly deeming class action waivers
in arbitration agreements as unenforceable.
Section I of this article explains the background and history on
the Federal Arbitration Act. Section II examines the potential conflict
3
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between the purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act and class action
suits in employment law. Section III explores the current discourse
regarding the conflict between the Federal Arbitration Act and the
National Labor Relations Act in the context of the recent court ruling
in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis. Section IV explicates the potential
consequences of this article’s claim.

I. What is the Federal Arbitration Act?6
Essentially, the Federal Arbitration Act provides that contract clauses
requiring arbitration between parties must be upheld. As a method of
dispute resolution, arbitration is a low-cost and time-efficient alternative to judicial litigation that also benefits more parties. The Federal Arbitration Act capitalizes on this benefit.
Section 2 of the FAA provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle
by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole
or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.7

6

Prior to the Industrial Revolution, judges and magistrates in the United
States viewed arbitration with hostility. The forthcoming industrial boom
brought with it an overwhelming quantity of lawsuits, making it difficult
for U. S. courts to address all of the cases in their queues. To streamline
the judicial process, President Calvin Coolidge signed the United States
Arbitration Act (the “Federal Arbitration Act” or “FAA”) into law, which
“declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of
the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.” Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).

7

See, Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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In 2001, the Federal Arbitration Act’s application to specifically
employment contracts first came under scrutiny. Section 1 of the
FAA provides that:
...“commerce”, as herein defined, means commerce among
the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or
between any such Territory and another, or between any
such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between
the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign
nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. 8
In 2001, the Supreme Court clarified the application of this section
in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, ruling that employment contracts that included arbitration agreements were not exempt from the
FAA. In the opinion, the Court further interpreted Section 1 of the
FAA to apply more narrowly to employment contracts with seamen,
railroad employees, and other transportation employees. To exclude
all employment contracts from the scope of the FAA would “[fail]
to give independent effects to the statute’s enumeration of the specific
categories of workers which precedes it.”9 Under this reasoning, arbitration agreements in employment contracts that exist outside of the
enumerated industries in Section 1 are now fully enforceable by law.

II. The Federal Arbitration Act v. Class Action Suits
By understanding the historical application of the Federal Arbitration
Act and class action suits in employment law, we can better see that the
two share the same overarching purpose—to streamline the judicial
process and decrease costs of litigation. The only difference between
the two lies in who their primary beneficiaries are—the FAA on the
side of the employer and class action suits on that of the employee.

8

See, Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1.
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Before 1995, courts were unsure of how to interpret the phrase
“involving commerce” in Section 2 of the FAA.10 Consequently,
industries pressured the courts to define what implications the
phrase would have in relation to the FAA and its applications. The
FAA was also ambiguous in other areas that have only been clarified
in recent decades. For instance, it was only in 1984 with Southland
Corp. v. Keating that it became clear that the FAA applied in state
courts as well as in federal courts. Previously, the FAA was “by
all accounts intended to be ‘a procedural statute applicable only in
the federal courts.’” 11 In the decades between the enactment of the
FAA and the year 1984, the courts viewed arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution between businessmen, not between
other parties involved in commerce such as consumers, employees,
investors, and others unless these parties had agreed to arbitrate.12 In
1967, however, the Court held that the FAA applies in diversity cases
in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., implying that the
FAA creates substantive law instead of regulating mere procedure.13
Finally, in 1995, the Supreme Court held that the phrase “involving commerce” signaled the full exercise of Congress’s power under
the commerce clause.14 In other words, the FAA applies to contracts
affecting all commerce—not only those with interstate connections.
In some instances, state courts and legislatures have attempted
to invalidate or restrict certain mandatory arbitration agreements,
but the Supreme Court has consistently decided that the FAA overrules any state laws or regulations. The reasoning originates from

10

See, Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2.

11

See, Jack Wilson, No-Class-Action Arbitration Clauses, State-Law Unconscionability, and the Federal Arbitration Act: A Case for Federal Judicial
Restraint and Congressional Action, 23 QLR 737, 738 (2004).

12

Id. at 739.
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Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404-05
(1967).
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the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.15 Additionally, as the
Court has noted, the FAA “was designed to overrule the judiciary’s
long-standing refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate.” 16 Section 2
compels courts to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with
all other contracts. States thereby act unlawfully when they single
out arbitration clauses with the purpose of treating them differently
to other contracts. The Federal Arbitration Act itself does not contain an express preemption clause. However, the Court has held that,
pursuant to implied preemption principles, the FAA supersedes state
laws that “undermine the goals and policies of [the Act].” 17
The Court has also determined that the FAA’s “overarching
purpose…is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements
according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”
18
This way, corporations may seek proper redress or resolve legal
disputes more quickly and easily in an authorized setting. After all,
arbitration takes an average of 475 days to reach a decision, while the
traditional judicial forum might take anywhere from 2 to 3 years to
reach a similar decision. 19
In summary, the Federal Arbitration Act has three overarching
purposes: 1) to grant legitimacy to contract law, 2) to streamline
judicial proceedings, and 3) to offer a low-cost and time-efficient
alternative to litigation for businesses.

15

Jon O. Shimabukuro & Jennifer A. Staman, Cong. Research Serv.,
R44960, Mandatory Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act 5
(2017).

16

See, Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S. at 478.

17

Id. at 477.

18

Id. at 478.
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David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey, & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the
Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. Pa. Journal
of Labor and Employment Law 73, 85-89 (1999).
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A. Class Action Suits in Employment Law
Why then were class action suits originally allowed in employment
disputes? Justice Ginsberg enumerated and implied several reasons
in her dissenting opinion in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis: 20
1. Individual employee claims are small, “scarcely of a
size warranting the expense of seeking redress alone;”
2. Employees can gain effective redress “by joining
together with others similarly circumstanced;”
3. Employees may match the clout of employers in setting
terms and conditions of employment, and
4. Judicial proceedings may be streamlined, lowering cost
and time demands in litigation for individual employees.
Class action suits in employment law, then, were allowed for reasons that mirror those of the Federal Arbitration Act. It seems the
difference is that class action suits serve the needs of the employee
while the FAA protects the interests of the employer. Regardless of
whether Congress meant for this application of the FAA to be biased,
the judicial system is allowing it to take on that exact nature.
Outside of employment law, the Supreme Court ruled on American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, a case regarding class
action suits and the FAA within the context of a violation of antitrust
laws. The class action plaintiffs’ main assertion was that individual
litigation, as required by their contracts with American Express,
would cost employees far more money to prove their case than they
could ever receive in damages. The Court acknowledged that the
class action plaintiffs had no cost-effective remedy to American
Express Company’s alleged violation of the antitrust laws but held
that an arbitration agreement that precluded class-wide proceedings

20

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (5-4 decision) (Ginsburg, R., dissenting).
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was still enforceable. Their reasoning was that the FAA could only
be overridden in the event of a “contrary congressional command.” 21
In recent years, employers have increasingly instituted class
action waivers in their employment contracts to restrict employees’ rights to bring a legal action. 22 Specifically, they have nestled
an individual dispute resolution requirement into their arbitration
clauses to effectively disregard the rights granted to employees in
the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”) and take advantage
of the coverage offered by the FAA. Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act guarantees employees “the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.” 23 Similarly, Section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in their exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7. 24 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has validated employers’
interferences with the right of employees to join in concerted judicial activities. The Court’s recent decisions regarding the FAA—like
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis—suggest that the American judicial
system, when forced to choose between a human being and a corporate entity, will consistently side with the latter.

III. In the Context of Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis
On May 21, 2018, the Supreme Court published a majority decision
regarding the case Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis. This was a consolidated case that also included Ernst & Young v. Morris and National
Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc, all of which were
21

Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013).

22

Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic,
Economic Policy
Institute (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitrationepidemic/.

23

See, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 7.

24
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grappling with the discrepancies in the Federal Arbitration Act and
the National Labor Relations Act. 25
Epic Systems Corporation (“Epic”) is a healthcare data management software company based in Wisconsin. Like other companies,
Epic requires all of its employees to sign an arbitration agreement
that effectively waives the employees’ rights to participate in or benefit from any class, collective, or representative proceedings. This
means that any legal dispute between an employee and the company
must be resolved through individual arbitration. 26
In February 2015, Jacob Lewis, a former employee at Epic, sued
the corporation for denial of overtime wages in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938. The issue was that Lewis, despite having signed the arbitration agreement previously mentioned, filed his
suit in federal court individually and on behalf of a class of employees similarly affected. Epic reacted by citing the waiver clause of
its arbitration agreement as evidence supporting its motion to dismiss Lewis’ suit. The federal district court ruled that the waiver
was unenforceable under Section 7 and Section 8 of the National
Labor Relations Act. With the reasoning that “concerted activities”
included class action suits, the federal district court denied Epic’s
motion to dismiss. However, Epic Systems Corporation appealed.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the decision of the lower court, adding that the class-action waiver in the
arbitration agreement was unenforceable under the saving clause of
the FAA as well. Epic Systems Corporation appealed yet again with
a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari and addressed Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis in late 2017. 27
Much of the Epic Systems v. Lewis case dealt with the interpretation of the FAA, being that the act serves as the basis for the absolute enforceability of arbitration agreements. As mentioned before,
the Supreme Court noted in American Express Company v. Italian
25

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct., 1612 (2018).

26

See, Recent Case, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis., 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018),
132 Harv. L. Rev. 427 (2018).

27

Id.
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Colors Restaurant that a “contrary congressional command” could
override the enforcement of an arbitration agreement pursuant to the
FAA. 28 Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis essentially brought this exception into question and forced the court to decide if class-action suits
were protected under the NLRA and as such were non-waivable
under the FAA. 29
The Supreme Court responded by reversing the lower courts’
decision and upholding the validity of employment contracts that
force employees to give up their right to collective litigation against
their employer. Five justices argued that the express terms of the
FAA should overcome the implied or subjective interpretation of
the rights afforded to employees by the NLRA. 30 Additionally, they
noted that the Supreme Court “had previously allowed for arbitration
of statutory claims even when those other statutes expressly allowed
for collective litigation.” 31
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg analyzed the situation within a historical context and argued that by upholding the validity of classaction waivers in arbitration agreements, the Supreme Court was
essentially prioritizing the FAA in subordination of employee-protective labor legislation such as the NLRA and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 32 These two pieces of legislation were originally enacted
to “correct power imbalances between employers and employees”
33
. In her review of relevant case law, the FAA, and the NLRA, Justice Ginsburg concluded that nothing merited the dismissal of fundamental protections afforded to employees by the National Labor
Relations Act.
Thus, the ruling on Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis begs the question: is it just to allow arbitration agreements to restrict employees’
28

Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013).

29

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct., 1612 (2018).

30

See, Recent Case, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis., 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018),
132 Harv. L. Rev. 427 (2018).

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.
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statutory rights with the sole purpose of achieving the FAA’s underlying objective to streamline the judicial process?
In past cases, the Court has answered this question with a
resounding “yes,” repeatedly concluding that an arbitration can, in
fact, restrict the enforcement of a right. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., for example, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) came into conflict with the Federal Arbitration
Act, and the Court ruled that the claim alleging a violation of the
ADEA could be subject to compulsory arbitration. 34 The Supreme
Court held that an arbitration agreement could be upheld in a securities application. However, past cases like Gilmer differ from Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis in material fact. Whereas Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. dealt with deciding what kinds of contracts were exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, Epic Systems
prioritized the issue that the consideration in the arbitration agreement eliminates both a judicial and arbitral forum for concerted
activity, a right provided by the NLRA. This should be deemed
illegal consideration. Additionally, without class action suits, these
employees would be deprived of their right to seek redress because
of the additional financial, time, and employment burden it would
place on these plaintiffs.
In order to resolve the legality and ethics of using the Federal
Arbitration Act to waive the right to collective legal action, we must
explore two avenues of reasoning: 1) Do the rights in the Federal
Arbitration Act preclude those of the National Labor Relations Act?
and 2) Does public policy and the legal system mandate the enforceability of arbitration agreements in the context of employment law?
A. Do the rights in the Federal Arbitration Act preclude those of the
National Labor Relations Act?
This question deals specifically with the American Express Company v. Italian Colors Restaurant ruling that allows the enforcement of an arbitration agreement to be overridden by a “contrary

34

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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congressional command,” 35 which, in this article, we will narrow to
be the NLRA. The conflict between the FAA and the rights afforded
by the NLRA should push either the judicial system or the legislative
system to act in support of class action rights. As mentioned previously, the NLRA forbids employers from interfering in any way with
their employees’ exercise of rights, individually and collectively, that
are within the scope of the NLRA. According to a majority of the
Supreme Court, the NLRA is not an exception to the FAA on the
basis of a “contrary congressional command.” 36
The principal argument is that the NLRA fails to expressly indicate class action suits as a right included under “concerted activities.”
37
However, precedent indicates that express terms are unnecessary.
In Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, the Court established a test to determine whether any congressional command is
“deducible from…text or legislative history” or from an inherent
conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.38
This well-established test strongly suggests that implied terms in
a congressional command are sufficient to infer the existence of
those terms.
Justice Gorsuch argues that even while examining the implied
rights of the NLRA, he found no evidence that the NLRA evinces
congressional intent to bar application of the FAA. He compared the
NLRA to other statutes with more express rights in favor of class
action suits and “observed that it would be anachronistic to construe
Section 7 to confer class action rights, considering that Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23 did not exist until 30 years after the NLRA
was enacted” 39 (HLR). The majority opinion justifies its ruling
35

Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013).

36

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct., 1612 (2018).

37

See, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 7.

38

Arbitration and Class Actions - National Labor Relations Act - District
Court Enforces Class Action Waiver in Employment Arbitration Agreement - Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 126 Harv. L. Rev.
1122, 1123 (2013).

39

See, Recent Case, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis., 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018),
132 Harv. L. Rev. 427 (2018).
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based on a strict, narrow interpretation of law. While a majority
of the Supreme Court deemed this interpretation as legally sound,
a minority dissented. The dissenting opinion evinced a broader
interpretation of the NLRA to uncover its implied meaning. Justice
Ginsburg interpreted the NLRA in its historical context, concluding that its purpose was “to place employers and employees on a
more equal footing.” 40 In order to effectively negotiate the terms of
employment, employees must have the capacity to match the clout
of their employers—something that can only be achieved through
collective means.
The enormous power that employers wield in drafting employment contracts should not excuse them from observing relevant statutes such as the NLRA. The problem of unbalanced power exists in
all legal fields and is one that the courts have anxiously strived to
remedy. For example, courts have historically determined that we, as
people, deserve to be represented in court regardless of our financial
capabilities. Although the scope of this paper falls squarely within
civil law, an example in criminal law may help to illustrate the historical attitude of the legal system. It is clear that an individual would
not have the personal clout to defend him- or herself against the prosecutorial power of the United States of America. As such, the Sixth
Amendment has been interpreted to provide an indicted citizen with
a defense attorney regardless of whether he or she can afford it. This
equality of representation is one of the central premises upon which
our legal system is founded.
In consumer law, we see a similar conflict occurring in arbitration agreements and class action waivers between corporations
and consumers. Because companies generally draft contracts of

40

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (5-4 decision) (Ginsburg, R., dissenting).
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adhesion41 in their favor, they often include individual arbitration
clauses that either escape the consumer’s awareness or force the
consumer to agree to it. After all, these companies understand that
arbitration has “traditionally been more beneficial to the corporate
defendants.” 42 Litigation in a judicial forum can already be especially
costly for the individual plaintiff, but these costs can become even
more onerous when the plaintiff is an individual consumer seeking
redress from a large corporation through arbitration. The high costs
of seeking redress would most certainly outweigh the potential damages or relief to be recovered through legal action. Although these
employment contracts are not necessarily categorized as contracts of
adhesion, the central concern still applies: the costs for an individual
plaintiff in either a judicial forum or arbitration would be onerous,
especially against a large corporation.
If the purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is “to place
employers and employees on a more equal footing,” then corporations have consistently flouted employees’ rights by using the lack
of express terms in their arbitration clauses as their main defense.
43
This loophole in the Federal Arbitration Act, which corporations
have abused time and time again, is a serious threat to the NLRA’s
congressional command.
The Federal Arbitration Act demands that courts subject arbitration agreements to the same laws that govern contract law. If arbitrations are contrary to an existing statute, then the consideration of
41

An adhesion contract (also called a “standard form contract” or a “boilerplate contract”) is a contract drafted by one party (usually a business with
stronger bargaining power) and signed by another party (usually one with
weaker bargaining power, usually a consumer in need of goods or services). The second party typically does not have the power to negotiate or
modify the terms of the contract. Adhesion contracts are commonly used
for matters involving insurance, leases, deeds, mortgages, automobile purchases, and other forms of consumer credit. Cornell Law School Legal
Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/adhesion_contract_(contract_of_adhe-sion) (last visited Jan. 28, 2020).

42

Sarah Clasby Engel & Sherry Tropin, Class Action Arbitration: A Plaintiff’s Perspective, 5 FIU L. Rev. 145 (2009).

43

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct., 1612 (2018).
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the arbitration agreement is illegal and deemed—not only unconscionable as other courts have decided—but void or unenforceable.
Contract law stipulates, “Even where such nullity is not specifically directed by the legislature, public policy is generally thought
to require it, either to punish lawbreakers by withholding societal
assistance from an illegal transaction, or to maintain the integrity of
the judicial process.” 44
As such, if the judicial system fails to reconcile the FAA with the
NLRA for its lack of express rights, the legislative system must then
uphold employees’ judicial rights by express congressional command.
B. Does public policy and the legal system mandate the enforceability
of arbitration agreements in the context of employment law?
Public policy supports the substantive right to class action suits,
so the legal system must support public policy because it affects
nearly all aspects of public and private life. It “importantly shapes
the responses to public risks…which jeopardize the welfare of the
community as a whole. The legal system also shapes the social,
political, and economic environment in which public risks arise and
are responded to.” 45 Several possible risks of deeming individual
arbitration agreements in employment contracts as unenforceable
have been outlined in past case decisions and current legal dialogue.
Courts and legal professionals are concerned that doing so might
undermine contract law, increase court traffic, or encourage more
employee lawsuits.
However, in the matter of this claim undermining contract law,
this article does not support a broad rejection of the Federal Arbitration Act but rather a firm rejection of questionable contract practices.
44

See, Validity of Contracts Which Violate Regulatory Statutes, 50 Yale L.J.
1108 (1941). (“Even where such nullity is not specifically directed by the
legislature, public policy is generally thought to require it, either to punish
lawbreakers by withholding societal assistance from an illegal transaction,
or to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.” (emphasis added))

45

Geoffrey C Hazard. The Role of the Legal System in Responses to Public
Risk. Daedalus, vol. 119, no. 4, 1990, pp. 229–234. JSTOR, www.jstor.
org/stable/20025347. Accessed 28 Jan. 2020.
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In Shotts v. OP Winter Haven, Inc., the Supreme Court of Florida
asserts, “With respect to which contract defenses...constitute ‘generally applicable contract defenses’ for purposes of section 2 [of the
FAA], we conclude that public policy clearly is such a defense, for
if an arbitration agreement violates public policy, no valid agreement exists.” 46 Global Travel Marketing, Inc. v. Shea emphasizes
the same principle: “No valid agreement exists if the arbitration
clause is unenforceable on public policy grounds.” 47 The Supreme
Court of the United States itself explained in Doctor’s Associates,
Inc. v. Casarotto that “generally applicable contract defenses, such
as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate
arbitration agreements without contravening [the Federal Arbitration Act].”48 Considering the purpose of the NLRA, the Court, for
lack of legal contract consideration, cannot possibly enforce arbitration agreements within employment contracts. Upholding their
enforceability would actually be undermining public policy and, as
a result, contract law.
The risk of possible increase in court traffic is valid but not as
threatening as generally believed. Class action suits help fulfill the
main purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, which is “to streamline
judicial proceedings.” 49 The consolidation of these claims into class
action suits allows for efficient class-wide redress in terms of time
and money. Though the allowance of class action suits in employment
law may increase court traffic, lawmakers and judges’ more pressing
concern should be the heavy decrease in legal claims brought against
companies by employees. This decrease does not act as evidence that
companies are improving corporate governance, but rather indicates
that employees are unable to afford the costs of pursuing individual

46
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arbitration claims, given that such costs far outweigh the potential
rewards that employees could receive from damages.50
Some may argue that the number of legal claims decreased
because most of them were frivolous to begin with. This argument,
though possible in a minority of cases, is overall specious. Indeed,
some corporations worry that if they were to refrain from enforcing arbitration agreements, they would encourage more employees
to bring lawsuits against them. But these corporations must realize
that although class action suits would make judicial proceedings less
costly for the individual, these costs are not insignificant. Enacting
legal claims might even cause conflict and tension within the workplace if plaintiff-employees still work for the employer in violation.
An individual would only feel the need to launch a class-wide complaint if employers actually violated the law, and did so in a fashion
that affected more than a handful of employees. To offset possible
frivolous cases, the corporation is perfectly justified in including an
attorney fee provision clause in their employment contracts.
Additionally, proponents of mandatory arbitration agreements
may reasonably believe that class action suits are an immense
expense and detriment to firm cash flow. However, they are missing
the bigger picture. As legislative acts, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002,51 mandate corporate governance, we see that enacted
laws must be slowly moving towards increasing the responsibility
of businesses and employers. If a firm truly wants long-term cash
flow and high firm value, would it not want to have the foresight to
incorporate this attitude and firm culture of accountability sooner
rather than later? Part of this requirement is providing an avenue
for addressing mistreatment of employees that is equitable to both
parties. In the long run, firm managers and investors will profit from
learning how to better manage and be accountable to employees.
Thus, the risks of upholding the right to collective legal action
over the enforceability of arbitration agreements can be mitigated
by simple measures. On the other hand, the risk of enforcing class
50
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action waivers certainly jeopardizes the welfare of the community.
Already, it has quashed the ability of employees to seek legal redress
for violations of their rights, which in and of itself is a violation of
employees’ ethical rights.
In addition to this, mandatory arbitration clauses have also
prevented employees from seeking redress when they have experienced sexual harassment at their jobs. In a letter sent to the House
of Representatives and the Senate, the attorney generals of every
state, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories admonished,
“The secrecy requirements of arbitration clauses…disserve the public interest by keeping both the harassment complaints and any settlements confidential ...This veil of secrecy may then prevent other
persons similarly situated from learning of the harassment claims so
that they, too, might pursue relief.” 52Essentially, these attorney generals called for legislation to exempt sexual harassment victims from
mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts. Silencing
claims of mistreatment is a disservice to not only public interest, but
to business interest as well.
Given the recent decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the
Supreme Court is unfortunately keener on enforcing imbalance in
favor of corporations rather than reprimanding them for their gross
disregard for public policy and business ethics. Clearly, the financial well-being of a corporation is vital to the lifeblood of a nation.
Corporations are entities that have been and will continue being protected by the judicial system—as they should be. However, these
companies still must adhere to their duties to public policy and ethical behavior. If businesses fail to follow regulations imposed upon
them by labor law, employees must have some method available to
them for seeking equitable redress that is financially feasible.
Since public policy mandates the right of employees to seek judicial redress, either the judicial system or the legislative system must
move forward to uphold this right by either overturning the precedent set by Epic Systems or by passing a legislative act.
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As we prepare to take the next step, let us look again at the two
questions we considered earlier: 1) Do the rights in the Federal Arbitration Act preclude those of the National Labor Relations Act? And
2) Does public policy and the legal system mandate the enforceability of arbitration agreements in the context of employment law?
Justice Ginsburg poses a question in her dissenting opinion:
“Does the Federal Arbitration Act permit employers to insist that
their employees, whenever seeking redress for commonly experienced wage loss, go it alone, never mind the right secured to employees by the National Labor Relations Act ‘to engage in…concerted
activities’ for their ‘mutual aid or protection’?” Similar to the answer
to the question posed by Justice Ginsburg, the answers to both of
these questions “should be a resounding ‘No.’” 53

IV. Potential Consequences
It is beyond the scope of this article to predict what the outcome
would have been for Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis had the Court
decided to allow a class action suit to form and press charges against
Epic. However, such a decision would have at least enabled the judicial system to impart a more equitable result for the parties represented in the case.
At the moment, the Supreme Court’s ruling has effectively
silenced employees’ concerns. Empirical evidence shows that only a
fraction of employment claims is actually filed in arbitration.54
Furthermore, Reuters suggests that the effects of the Court’s
decision extend beyond legal implications55 Shareholders value corporate governance; when they invest capital in a firm, they are also
placing trust in that firm’s corporate culture. Mandatory arbitration
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agreements silence employees and prevent investors from obtaining
a crucial source of private information regarding any alleged mistreatment of employees that could be part of that corporate culture.
Information is vital in semi-efficient markets such as those in the
United States, and the lack thereof could not only slow efficiency of
financial markets but also negatively affect shareholder wealth.
It follows, then, that the opposite of enforcing mandatory arbitration agreements— allowing employees the forum of judicial classaction litigation—would actually serve to increase the value of the
firm and maximize shareholder wealth, which is the principal purpose of any firm or manager.56 More employee information enables
investors to more accurately gauge firm value and make necessary
changes. Whether the firm is publicly or privately traded, investors
and managers benefit from this greater exchange of information—
especially if that information will cause a significant adjustment of
expectations.
If employees’ claims are not barred from class action proceedings,
the number of employee claims would not magically increase but the
number formally filed certainly would. Employers would be held more
accountable to responsible and ethical corporate governance.
To be fair, employees do have options other than litigation to
effect change within their employer. They may complain to the
Department of Labor—known as “whistleblowing”—and have those
officials investigate the company. However, this begs the question: is
the judicial system really working at its best if whistleblowing is the
only way to seek proper redress? Another option lies entirely in the
hands of lawmakers; the legislature may pass new bills outlawing
class action waivers to expressly make them contrary to congressional command. In 2017, lawmakers proposed bills doing exactly that
with the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017 and the Restoring Statutory Rights and Interest of the States Act of 2017. Unfortunately,
little progress or movement has been observed since.
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V. Conclusion
The very purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is subservient—
legally and ethically—to that of the National Labor Relations Act.
Even so, the Supreme Court has upheld arbitration agreements that
have gone as far as violating the implied purpose of congressional
acts that protect the rights of employees—specifically, the right
to seek judicial redress within their financial means. This right is
mandated by both precedent and public policy. Upholding this right
would not only maintain the integrity of the legal system but also
benefit the very corporations that fight against it. Corporate governance would be enforced more heavily, thus maximizing long-term
shareholder wealth. The economy as a whole would become more
efficient from the increase in transparent information if the legislature or judicial system held all corporations to this same standard.
And what if the majority opinion in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis
really is the most legally sound? Then, all the more reason that the
legislature must remedy the loophole that businesses are increasingly abusing to quash the substantive rights of their employees. The
ethical and public policy-related discussions of this article still hold.
We turn back to the legal and governmental system. If the
Supreme Court does not overturn its decision in Epic Systems Corp.
v. Lewis in subsequent cases, the immediate solution to this gross
injustice to the interests and rights of employees is clear. The legislature ought to realign the goals of the Federal Arbitration Act with
those of the National Labor Relations Act and enact an amendment
or a clarifying congressional act to the Federal Arbitration Act,
expressly deeming class action waivers in arbitration agreements as
unenforceable.

